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With Religious Liberty for All:  
A Defense of the Affordable  
Care Act’s Contraception 
Coverage Mandate
Frederick Mark Gedicks*
The “contraception mandate” of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA”) poses a straightforward question for reli-gious liberty jurisprudence: Must government excuse religious persons 
from complying with a law they find burdensome, when doing so would violate the 
liberty of others by imposing on them the consequences of religious beliefs and prac-
tices that they do not share and which interfere with their own religious and other 
fundamental liberties? To pose this question is to answer it: One’s religious liberty 
does not include the right to interfere with the liberty of others.
The contraception mandate strikes a careful and sensible balance of competing lib-
erty interests by exempting religious persons and organizations who do not externalize 
the costs of their religious beliefs and practices onto others who do not share them. It 
exempts churches that largely employ and serve persons of their own faith, but not 
religious employers who hire and serve large numbers of employees who do not belong 
to the employer’s religion or who otherwise reject its anti-contraception values.
That religious liberty is a fundamental constitutional value is not in doubt.1 Access 
to contraceptives is also a fundamental constitutional liberty.2 Constitutionally guar-
anteed access to contraception, moreover, is a critical component of the well-being 
and advancement of women. Control over reproduction has enabled women to time 
and space their pregnancies, thereby preserving and enhancing their health and that 
of their new-born children,3 and enabling them to enter the workforce on more equal 
terms with men.4
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham young University Law School. Questions and 
comments may be directed to the author at gedicksf@law.byu.edu. This Issue Brief was first released by 
ACS in October 2012.
1 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office or public Trust under the United States.”); id., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof … .”).
2 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 380 U.S. 947 (1965).
3 See, e.g., Sylvia Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 wASh. L. ReV. 363, 
369-70 (1998); Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of  Contraceptive Services and Supplies 
without Cost-Sharing, 14 gUTTMAcheR PoL. ReV. 7, 7-8 (Winter 2011).
4 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (“The ability of women to partici-
pate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control 
their reproductive lives.”); Sonfield, supra note 3, at 9 (Access to oral contraception allowed women to 
“invest in higher education and a career with far less risk of an unplanned pregnancy,” and resulted in 
“fewer first births to high school- and college-aged women, increased age at first marriage, increased par-
ticipation by women in the workforce and more children born to mothers who were married, college-edu-
cated and had pursued a professional career.”).
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Contraception nevertheless remains a significant expense beyond the reach of 
many women, because most health insurance plans and policies do not cover them,5 
or cover them only with substantial patient cost-sharing.6 The most effective oral con-
traceptive drugs cost between $180 and $960 per year, depending on the drug pre-
scribed and the area of the country where the prescription is filled, in addition to the 
prescribing doctor’s examination fees which can range from $35 to $250 per visit.7 
Many women experience side effects from the cheapest oral contraceptives (which are 
usually generic brands) or find that these are less effective for them in preventing preg-
nancy.8 Some of the most inexpensive contraception, such as intrauterine devices 
(“IUDs”) and anti-contraceptive drug implants, have high up-front costs ranging from 
$500 to $800, in addition, again, to one or more examination fees.9 Such costs are a 
significant financial obstacle to the use of contraception by working-class and lower-
income women,10 and simple economics suggests that women of all but the highest 
income classes are likely to use contraceptives more often and more consistently when 
they can obtain them at no cost.
The ACA seeks to reduce health care costs and improve public health and well-be-
ing by encouraging the use of preventive health care services. It thus requires that 
group health plans and individual insurance policies cover a range of preventive ser-
vices without “cost-sharing”—that is, without copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, 
or other amounts paid by the patient.11 It is widely agreed that contraception use sub-
stantially reduces health care costs.12 Accordingly, administrative rules adopted by the 
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (collectively, the 
“Departments”) following enactment of the ACA define “preventive health care ser-
vices” to include FDA-approved contraceptive methods and counseling, including 
5 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 369-70 (“Except for health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 
about two-thirds of private insurance plans exclude coverage for contraceptive pills, even though virtually 
all private insurance plans include coverage for other prescription drugs.”); C. Keanin Loomis, A Battle 
over Birth “Control”: Legal and Legislative Employer Prescription Contraception Benefit Mandates, 11 
wM. & MARY bILL RTS. J. 463 (2002) (“[I]t is estimated that forty-nine percent of all health care plans still 
do not offer prescription contraceptives.”).
6 See, e.g., Sonfield, supra note 3, at 10 (“A 2010 study found that women with private insurance that 
covers prescription drugs paid 53% of the cost of their oral contraceptives,” and that this expense amount-
ed to “29% of their annual out-of-pocket expenditures for all health services.”).
7 E.g., PLAnned PARenThood, bIRTh conTRoL MeThodS—bIRTh conTRoL oPTIonS, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-control-4211.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter “Birth Control Costs”]; Ctr. for Am. Progress, The High Costs of Birth Control: It’s 
Not As Affordable As you Think (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/
news/2012/02/15/11054/the-high-costs-of-birth-control/.
8 Cf. Sonfield, supra note 3, at 9 (“[O]ne-third of women using reversible contraception would switch 
methods if they did not have to worry about cost; these women were twice as likely as others to rely on 
lower-cost, less effective methods.”).
9 “Birth Control Costs,” supra note 7; James Trussell et al., Cost Effectiveness of  Contraceptives in 
the United States, 79 conTRAcePTIVeS 5, 5-6, 9-10, 13 (2009).
10 See Law, supra note 3, at 392-93.
11 Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 2713, 124 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)) (2010).
12 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 366-67 & n.13, 394-95; Loomis, supra note 5, at 477-78; Sonfield, 
supra note 3, at 10; Trussell, supra note 9, at 5.
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“emergency contraception” which can prevent pregnancy after intercourse or fertiliza-
tion, such as Plan B (the “morning-after pill”), Ella (the “week-after pill”), and IUDs.13
Some religious organizations and persons objected to the mandate on theological 
grounds. Roman Catholic teaching, for example, condemns the use of all “artificial” 
methods of contraception. Catholic universities, hospitals, charities, and other non-
profit organizations thus objected to the requirement that their group health plans 
comply with the mandate, even though they employ and serve large numbers of non-
Catholics. Nonprofits affiliated with Protestant denominations and other religions 
that do not generally condemn contraceptive use objected to the mandated coverage 
of emergency contraception, which their affiliated religions teach is morally equiva-
lent to aborting a pregnancy—again, even though they employ and service large num-
bers who do not object to emergency contraception. Finally, a few private for-profit 
employers engaged in commercial businesses have objected to the mandate on the 
grounds that it violates the personal religious beliefs of their owners.
The Departments accommodated the objections of religious employers by exempt-
ing from the mandate tax-exempt organizations whose mission is the teaching of reli-
gious values primarily to members of their own faith through employees of their own 
faith.14 In effect, this definition exempted churches and their integrated auxiliaries. 
Some religious nonprofit and commercial employers continued to object to the man-
date because their provision of secular or commercial products and services to per-
sons outside their affiliated faith, and their employment of large numbers of people 
who do not belong to the faith, left them outside the proposed religious-employer 
exemption.15 When the government declined to enlarge the exemption, a number of 
these religious employers filed suit, arguing that the contraception mandate violated 
their rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).16
The rhetoric of religious employers challenging the mandate loosely frames the 
issue as an unwarranted federal violation of the religious liberty of nonexempt reli-
gious employers, and generally fails even to mention the federal government’s weighty 
13 Section 2713 of the Public Health Act, enacted as part of the ACA, included within the definition 
of preventive health care services “such additional preventive care and screenings” not otherwise covered, 
“as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration” (the “HRSA”). 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (West 2012). The HRSA subsequently adopted 
women’s coverage guidelines which include “contraceptive methods and counseling,” defined as “[a]ll Food 
and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education 
and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” HRSA, Women’s Preventive Services: Required 
Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
14 The implementing rules define a “religious employer”, as any employer that
 (1) “Has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose”;
 (2) “[P]rimarily employs persons who share its religious tenets”;
 (3) “[P]rimarily serves persons who share its religious tenets”; and
(4) “[I]s a non-profit organization” under enumerated sections of the Internal Revenue Code which 
generally refer to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of church-
es, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.”
76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 2011) (citing and describing I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(1), - (a)(3)(A)(i) & - 
(a)(3)(A)(iii)).
15 For a summary of comments for and against the religious-employer exemption, see Group Health 
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726-27 (Feb. 15, 2012).
16 A link to the various lawsuits, which as of the date of this Paper numbered over thirty, is a main-
tained by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty at http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/.
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interests in protecting the religious liberty and enlarging the access to contraceptives 
of employees who do not share the religious values of their employers.
This Issue Brief demonstrates that the contraception mandate does not violate the 
Religion Clause or RFRA rights of religious employers.17 The mandate is a “religious-
ly neutral, generally applicable” law that does not discriminate against religious em-
ployers, does not entangle courts or government generally in disputes about theology 
or internal church governance, and does not “substantially burden” religious exercise. 
The mandate is additionally justified as the least restrictive means of protecting com-
pelling government interests. Finally, while all these conclusions apply fully to reli-
gious nonprofit organizations, they apply with special force to religious owners of 
secular businesses engaged in for-profit commercial markets.
I. RELIGION CLAUSES
A.	 free	exerCiSe	ClAuSe
It is well-established that burdens on individual religious exercise imposed by “re-
ligiously neutral, generally applicable” laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.18 
A free exercise exemption from the societal obligation to obey the law is generally 
compelled only when the law violates neutrality and generality by discriminating 
against or targeting religious conduct while leaving comparable secular conduct 
alone.19 As a religiously neutral, generally applicable law, the contraception mandate 
cannot plausibly be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause.
1. Religious Neutrality 
A law lacks religious neutrality if it restricts religious practices because they are 
religious—that is, if it discriminates on the basis of religion.20 Such discrimination 
occurs when a law defines the class it regulates in religious terms or applies only to 
certain religious people or to religion generally.21 A set of health and animal protec-
tion laws, for example, whose effect was to prohibit the animal-sacrifice rituals of a 
17 One federal district court recently rejected Religion Clause and RFRA challenges to the mandate, 
concluding that religious employers have no right to impose their religious beliefs on employees who reject 
them, O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), slip op. 
at 9-22, and two influential state supreme courts have rejected Religion Clause challenges to state contra-
ception mandates identical to that of the ACA on the same ground. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) and Catholic Charities of Diocese of 
Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.y. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007). On the other hand, one 
federal district court has temporarily restrained enforcement of the mandate on RFRA grounds against a 
single for-profit employer. Newland v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK (D. Colo. July 27, 2012).
18 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990). The Court has repeatedly affirmed this 
doctrine in the decades since Smith was decided. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 
2993 n.24 (2010); Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006); 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997); Church of 
the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012) (distinguishing Smith in recognizing ministerial exception to 
federal anti-discrimination laws).
19 E.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating municipal ordinances whose net combined effect 
permitted virtually all secular and religious killings of animals except those by minority religious sect).
20 Id. at 533. 
21 Id. (“[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law 
lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernible from the 
language or context.”); id. at 534, 535 (“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treat-
ment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. [] Apart from the 
text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”).
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minority sect while exempting hunting, fishing, and kosher slaughter from that prohi-
bition, constituted a “religious gerrymander” that is not religiously neutral.22
Some of the anti-mandate plaintiffs argue that the mandate’s religious exemption 
is not religiously neutral because it burdens the teachings, practices, or beliefs of reli-
gious employers that oppose contraception on religious grounds but do not fall within 
the exemption. The mandate obviously has a greater impact on Catholic and other 
religious institutions that oppose some or all of the mandated contraception coverage 
than it has on secular organizations and religious institutions that do not oppose any 
of the mandated coverage. This religiously disproportionate impact of the mandate, 
however, does not constitute religious discrimination or gerrymandering. Free exer-
cise doctrine condemns only intentional religious discrimination, not religious bur-
dens occurring as the incidental effect of a neutral and general law.23
The Departments determined that employees of exempt religious employers were 
likely to adhere to their church’s anti-contraceptive orthodoxy regardless of the cost of 
the contraceptives, so that exempting such employers from the mandate would en-
hance religious liberty without significantly intruding upon the religious liberty of em-
ployees or undermining the mandate’s regulatory goal of affording women access to 
no-cost contraception.24 Nonexempt religious employers that oppose contraception, 
but are participating in a secular or commercial market that delivers goods or services 
to those outside as well as within the faith largely through employment of persons who 
are not members of the faith, will almost always have a large number of employees 
who do not share their employer’s opposition to contraception and would likely use 
contraceptives (or use them more consistently) if they were available without cost-
sharing.25 With respect to such employers, the Departments determined to minimize 
“religious externalities”—that is, a religious organization’s use of the economic lever-
age that inheres in an employment relationship to impose its religious anti-contracep-
tion beliefs on unbelievers, members of other faiths, and members of the employer’s 
faith who do not share its understanding of the faith’s requirements. As the Departments 
observed, exempting religious organizations that participate in secular markets and 
employ large numbers of nonmember employees “would subject their employees to the 
religious views of the employer, limiting access to contraceptives, and thereby inhibit-
ing the use of contraceptive services and the benefits of preventive care.”26
There is little doubt that the contraception mandate is religiously neutral. Neither 
the text of the ACA nor that of the implementing regulations facially discriminates on 
the basis of religion. Both apply the mandate to covered group health plans and health 
insurance carriers that are defined in purely secular terms. Nor are the ACA or its 
implementing regulations religiously gerrymandered or susceptible to discriminatory 
application that would to impose them on only some religious organizations, but not 
others.27 The only religious language in the regulations relates to the definition of 
22 See id. at 535.
23 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (The Free Exercise Clause is not violated where a burden on religious 
practice “is not the object … but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise 
valid” law.”). 
24 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 A religiously discriminatory pattern of enforcing the mandate and the exemption differently against 
religious employers could violate religious neutrality, cf. yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidat-
ing race-neutral ordinance applied in racially discriminatory manner), but any challenge on this ground 
will obviously have to await actual application and enforcement of the mandate and the exemption.
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“religious employers” who are exempt from the mandate. Finally, as a matter of con-
stitutional policy, it would make little sense to invalidate a religious exemption as “too 
narrow” when the free exercise doctrine relieves the government of the obligation to 
provide any exemption at all. Invalidating religious exemptions that relieve some but 
not all conceivable free exercise burdens would create the perverse governmental in-
centive not to allow any exemptions in the first place.28
2. General Applicability
The requirement of “general applicability” is an additional protection against reli-
gious discrimination or “targeting”—that is, a protection against laws that pursue 
legitimate secular objectives only against religious conduct.29 A law satisfies this re-
quirement if it does not focus its burdens solely or mostly on religious organizations 
or religious individuals.30 A large number of exemptions for secular but not religious 
conduct often signals a law’s lack of general applicability.
The vast majority of employers subject to the contraception mandate are secular. 
The mandate contains no secular exemptions, only the “religious employer” exemp-
tion. The mandate is thus generally applicable because it pursues its goal of providing 
widespread no-cost contraceptive coverage through all employers, not just religious 
ones. The ACA does exempt certain “grandfathered” group insurance plans from the 
no-cost preventive-care mandate of which the contraception mandate is a part, and 
also exempts certain religious persons from the entire ACA. Some of the anti-mandate 
plaintiffs have erroneously argued that when combined with these broader exemptions, 
the contraception mandate exempts so many persons or institutions that its refusal to 
exempt all religious employers violates the principle of general applicability. However, 
these exemptions do nothing to undermine the general applicability of the mandate.
a.	The	individuAl	inSurAnCe-purChASe	mAndATe	exempTionS	
The ACA exempts certain classes of persons from the mandate to purchase health 
insurance, such as those who belong to religions that reject the use of health insur-
ance, undocumented aliens, those incarcerated in federal or state prison, those who 
cannot afford coverage, members of federally recognized Indian tribes, and those 
granted a hardship exception by HHS.31 These exemptions to the “individual insur-
ance-purchase mandate” are irrelevant to analyzing the general applicability of the 
contraception mandate. Exemptions from the individual-purchase mandate excuse 
28 Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.y. 2006) (“To hold that any 
religious exemption that is not all-inclusive renders a statute non-neutral would be to discourage the en-
actment of any such exemptions—and thus to restrict, rather than to promote, freedom of religion.”), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007).
29 See Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“[L]aws 
burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. [I]nequality results when a legislature decides 
that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with 
a religious motivation.”).
30 Since a law that pursues legitimate government objectives only against religious organizations or 
individuals is not religiously neutral, it is not clear that general applicability has any independent doctri-
nal significance. The Court itself sees neutrality and generality as merely mutually reinforcing tests: A law 
that religiously discriminates is usually not generally applicable, and vice versa. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; 
see also id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the terms 
“substantially overlap”: Religious neutrality invalidates laws that facially discriminate on the basis of re-
ligion, whereas general applicability invalidates facially neutral laws that discriminate on the basis of reli-
gion “through their design, construction, or enforcement.”)
31 42 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)-(e) (West 2012).
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one from the obligation to purchase health insurance coverage, whereas exemption 
from the contraception mandate excuses one from the obligation to provide no-cost 
contraception coverage in an insurance plan; the one has nothing to do with the other. 
An exemption from the insurance-purchase mandate would not exempt a person from 
the contraception mandate (if he or she happened also to be an employer or insurer), 
and employers or insurers exempted from the contraception mandate would not au-
tomatically be exempted from the individual-purchase mandate (if they happened to 
be individuals). Indeed, the failure of the ACA to provide any exemptions at all from 
the individual-purchase mandate would not have impacted the contraception or pre-
ventive-care mandates, and vice versa.32 The goals of the individual-purchase man-
date differ substantially from the goals of the contraception and preventive-coverage 
mandates. Accordingly, religious employers that are not exempt from the contracep-
tion mandate cannot use the exemptions from the individual-purchase mandate to 
argue that the contraception mandate violates general applicability.
b.	The	“grAndfAThered	plAn”	exempTion	
The ACA allows individuals who are satisfied with their existing health care cover-
age to keep it. Accordingly, the ACA exempts from many of its provisions, including 
the contraception mandate, group health insurance plans existing on the date on 
which the ACA was enacted, as long as such plans do not significantly change the 
coverage they offered as of that date.33 This exemption is also generally applicable. 
Religiously sponsored group-insurance plans in existence when the ACA was enacted 
are as eligible as secularly sponsored plans to maintain their then-existing coverage 
and preserve their grandfathered-plan exemption from the ACA, including the contra-
ception mandate. Nothing in the text of the relevant statutory and regulatory provi-
sions imposes any greater burdens or requirements on religiously sponsored plans for 
obtaining and maintaining grandfathered status. Thus, like the individual-mandate 
exemptions, the grandfathered-plan exemption is also irrelevant to the analysis of the 
contraception mandate’s general applicability analysis.
*     *     *
Neither the “religious-employer” exemption to the contraception mandate, the in-
dividual exemptions to the individual-purchase mandate, nor the grandfathered-plan 
exemption to the ACA offers any benefits or advantages to secular employers that are 
not also available to religious employers. Taken together, the exemptions do not result 
in the contraception mandate’s being imposed solely or primarily on religious em-
ployers. To the contrary, employers subject to the mandate remain overwhelmingly 
secular notwithstanding these exemptions. Accordingly, none of these exemptions 
cause the contraception mandate to violate the principle of general applicability.
32 Cf. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (Exemption of 
undercover officers from police force’s no-beard policy did not violate principle of general applicability, 
because exemption of persons not identifiable as police officers had no effect on the policy’s goals of uni-
formity, morale, and esprit de corps.).
33 Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1251, 124 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011) (2010). The Departments 
view the grandfathered-plan exemption as transitional. Over time, they expect that the sponsors of most 
grandfathered plans will decide either to abandon grandfathered status and become fully subject to the 
ACA, or to cease offering group health insurance altogether. 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34547, 34548.
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B.	 eSTABliShmenT	ClAuSe
The Establishment Clause prohibits “theological entanglement”—the govern-
ment’s deciding questions of religious doctrine, intervening on one side or the other 
of a dispute about such questions, or interfering in the internal governance of reli-
gious congregations.34 Some of the mandate-litigation plaintiffs have argued that 
deciding whether a religious organization has the “inculcation of religious values” as 
its purpose and applying the other elements of the “religious-employer” exemption 
violate this anti-entanglement norm. The mandate, however, does not cause theo-
logical entanglement.
Courts may not decide religious questions, but they possess full power to decide 
whether and how the law applies to religious organizations and individuals. Legislative 
accommodations of religion would be impossible if government were “forbidden to 
distinguish between the religious entities and activities that are entitled to accommo-
dation and the secular entities and activities that are not.”35 Thus, the “ministerial 
exception” from federal antidiscrimination laws prohibits courts from deciding whom 
a congregation must accept as its minister, but courts are nevertheless empowered to 
decide who is a “minister” for the purpose of determining whether the exception ap-
plies to a congregational employment decision.36 Similarly, courts may not decide 
whether an organization’s decision to call itself a “religion” is theologically justified, 
but it may decide whether the organization is “religious” for the purpose of applying 
Internal Revenue Code laws that define charitable income tax deductions.37
The Establishment Clause prohibits a court from telling any religious employer 
what its values are with respect to contraception use and whether or how it must 
exercise them, but the Clause does not prohibit a court from deciding whether a reli-
gious organization qualifies for the “religious-employer” exemption as an organiza-
tion that exists to inculcate religious values.38 The exemption, therefore, does not 
entangle federal courts or the federal government generally in religious doctrine or 
religious disputes.
*     *     *
Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause provides any plau-
sible basis on which to challenge the contraception mandate. The contraception 
mandate lies fully within the constitutional limits that these Clauses place on govern-
ment action.
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
34 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangel. Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012); Serbian 
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 
(1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
35 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 79 (Cal.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 
816 (2004).
36 Compare Hosanna-Tabor Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (holding that 
Religion Clauses encompass a “ministerial exception” that prohibits the application of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act to a church’s decision to terminate a minister), with id. at 707-09 (analyzing wheth-
er plaintiff was a “minister” for purposes of the exception).
37 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989).
38 Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 n.30 (1982) (explaining that the Establishment Clause does 
not preclude government from requiring that organization claiming religious exemption prove that it is 
religious).
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RFRA provides that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion even if the burden results from a law of general applicability,” unless 
the government demonstrates that the burden furthers “a compelling government in-
terest” using “the least restrictive means.”39 This section discusses “substantial bur-
den” under RFRA, while Part III following immediately after, discusses the 
compelling-interest test, which applies to both free exercise and RFRA claims.
Nonexempt religious employers claim that the contraception mandate violates 
RFRA because their beliefs and teachings prohibit the use of some or all of the con-
traceptive coverage that the mandate requires. What follows concludes that (A) the 
simple addition of mandated contraception coverage to a plan sponsored by a nonex-
empt religious employer, without any other changes, does not constitute a “substan-
tial burden” on the religious exercise of such employers under RFRA; and (B) even 
assuming that it did, various alternative means of satisfying the mandate do not con-
stitute burdens on religious practice at all, let alone “substantial” ones. 
A.	 AddiTion	of	ConTrACepTive	CoverAge
The government imposes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise when it com-
pels a person or group “to engage in conduct proscribed by their religious beliefs,” or 
forces them “to abstain from any action which their religion mandates they take.”40 
Literal compulsion is not necessary for a burden to be “substantial;” “substantial 
pressure” on a person or group to modify their behavior in a way that violates their 
beliefs constitutes a substantial burden.41
The purported burden on nonexempt religious employers consists of requiring 
them to make contraceptives available through their health care plans, which, it is ar-
gued, violates their religious liberty to oppose a practice which they believe to be sin-
ful or immoral. The simple act of adding mandated coverage to an employer’s existing 
health plan, however, does not substantially burden an employer’s ability to oppose 
contraception, because it neither requires the employer to use contraceptives, nor to 
endorse, encourage, or pay any meaningful amount for such use.
1. Use
Nothing in the mandate requires or pressures any employer to use contraceptives. 
After complying with the mandate, a religious employer remains as free as before to 
refrain from using contraceptives.42 The mandate, therefore, does not burden at all a 
religious employer’s practice of the anti-contraception tenets of his or her religion.
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (West 2012). RFRA has been declared unconstitutional as applied to the 
states, but continues to be fully applicable against federal government action like the contraception man-
date. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
40 Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 
168, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1995). There is some question whether a secular for-profit business is a “person” who 
might “exercise” religion within the meaning of RFRA. Newland v. Sebelius, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-1123-JLK 
(D. Colo. July 27, 2012).
41 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
42 O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), slip op. 
at 11 (“[P]laintiffs remain free to exercise their religion, by not using contraceptives … .”); cf. Goehring v. 
Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (Mandatory state university student fee that subsidized health 
insurance covering abortion did not burden religious exercise of anti-abortion students under RFRA be-
cause they “are not required to accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of 
abortion services.”), overruled on other grounds, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (RFRA 
unconstitutional as applied to state action). 
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2. Endorsement
The mandate does not require any employer to endorse the use of the mandated 
contraception coverage.43 Nonexempt religious employers who oppose contraception 
are free to preach against the use of some or all of the covered services and otherwise 
to urge employees not to make use of them.44 Nor is there any implicit endorsement. 
Under the mandate, employers do not make any decision about the use of mandated 
contraceptives by their employees; all such decisions are made by each individual em-
ployee, who may not even be a member of the employer’s faith. It is hard to see, there-
fore, how employee decisions to use contraceptives constitute a “substantial burden” 
on the employer’s religious liberty right to avoid endorsing contraception use. This is 
particularly true because medical privacy laws make it impossible to know whether 
any employees are using contraceptives, and the employer remains free to speak out 
against contraceptives and to disassociate itself from their use.45
3. Facilitation
Nonexempt religious employers also object that the mandate requires them to “fa-
cilitate” conduct to which they religiously object. This is true in the sense that the 
mandate makes contraceptive use cheaper and more accessible; that is, after all, its 
goal. The relevant question, however, is not whether the mandate makes contracep-
tion use by employees of religious employers more likely, but whether any such effect 
constitutes a substantial burden on the employer’s religious exercise.
It is axiomatic that religious employers have no religious liberty right to limit the 
spending of employee compensation to conform to the employer’s religious sensibili-
ties. Health care insurance coverage is simply employee compensation. Instead of 
compensating employees entirely in wages or salary, the employer pays a reduced 
wage or salary plus a health insurance benefit. As with other employee compensation, 
decisions about whether or how to spend one’s health care benefit rest entirely with 
the employee. Compensating an employee with health care insurance that allows her 
to choose to use contraceptives does not facilitate contraception any more than pay-
ing wages or salary that the employee uses to purchase contraceptives outright.46
4. Subsidy
Whether the mandate in fact forces nonexempt religious employers to subsidize 
contraceptive use to which they religiously object may not be answerable in the 
43 Cf. Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1300.
44 O’Brien, slip op. at 11 (“[P]laintiffs remain free to exercise their religion … by discouraging employ-
ees from using contraceptives.”).
45 A useful analogy to this question exists in Establishment Clause doctrine. See Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Contraception Mandate (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript, copy in possession of author, 
cited with permission). In analyzing use of government funds and in-kind aid by religious organizations, 
the Court has repeatedly held that government aid that finds its way to religious organizations or individu-
als as the result of the genuinely independent choices of individuals is not attributable to the government 
and thus does not violate the Clause. E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993); Witters v. Dep’t 
of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). For example, private school 
voucher programs generally do not violate the Establishment Clause even if the primary beneficiaries are 
religious schools, because the decision to use the voucher at a religious school is made by individual par-
ents on behalf of their children, and not by the government. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649-51. Similarly, a reli-
gious employer’s inclusion of contraceptives in health plan coverage cannot reasonably be viewed as an 
endorsement of their use, when the decision to use them rests solely with individual employees and not 
with the employer.  
46 See O’Brien, slip op. at 12-13.
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abstract.47 Even if such a subsidy were found to exist, however, it would not constitute 
a substantial burden under RFRA. The courts have long held that compelled payment 
of a neutral and general tax does not burden the taxpayer’s religious free exercise even 
if a portion of the tax funds activities to which the taxpayer objects,48 concluding that 
in such cases the burden on the taxpayer’s religious exercise is insignificant because the 
amount of the taxpayer’s funds is minimal and is allocated to the objectionable activi-
ties indirectly as the result of the decisions of third parties.”49 The analysis for com-
pelled employer payment for health plan coverage of mandated contraceptives is 
virtually the same. The amount allocable to contraception coverage will be a tiny 
percentage of a plan’s reimbursable costs,50 and will be incurred indirectly as the result 
47 There is a broad consensus that the addition of contraception coverage would reduce the net reim-
bursable costs of any health insurance plan. Coverage of contraception does not appreciably increase the 
reimbursable costs of a health insurance plan, but substantially reduces substantial reimbursable costs 
from prenatal care, childbirth, and medical treatment of newborns. See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 366-67 
& n.13, 394-95; Loomis, supra note 5, at 477-78; Sonfield, supra note 3, at 10. See generally Trussell, supra 
note 9, at 5 (“Contraceptive use saves nearly US$19 billion in direct medical costs each year.”). Accordingly, 
the premiums charged to employers by third-party insurers are not likely to increase and could be even 
lower when plans add no-cost contraception coverage. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 8727-28. For any particular plan, 
then, its savings in net reimbursable costs avoided by addition of contraception coverage are likely to equal 
or exceed the costs of mandated contraception coverage. If a nonexempt religious employer sees its health 
insurance premiums remain the same or decline after adoption of mandated contraception coverage, then 
the marginal cost to the employer of adopting such coverage is zero or less. In an economic sense, the em-
ployer has not “paid” for the addition of the mandated coverage because it has not cost the employer any 
additional premium. In another sense, however, nonexempt religious employers who include mandated 
no-cost contraceptive coverage to their health plans are obviously paying for it: They pay a negotiated 
premium to a third party insurer for employee health care coverage that includes no-cost contraceptive 
services; some portion of the premium paid would logically seem to be allocable to the provision of con-
traception services. The subsidy is even more obvious in case of employers who self-insure their health care 
plans: Such employers will directly reimburse health care providers for the cost of the contraception ser-
vices they would provide under the mandate. Whether a religious-employer subsidy of contraceptive use in 
fact exists with respect to the any such employer’s health care insurance plan can only be answered by 
discovery and analysis of the plan in litigation.
48 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (mandatory payment of social security and unem-
ployment insurance taxes did not burden employer whose Amish tenets prohibited payment for or accep-
tance of government benefits); Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that use of por-
tion of mandatory student registration fee to subsidize student health insurance program that covered 
abortion did not substantially burden religious exercise of students whose beliefs forbid participation in 
abortions), overruled on other grounds, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding RFRA un-
constitutional as applied to state action); cf. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding 
that ACA’s individual insurance-purchase mandate did not substantially burden religious exercise of per-
sons whose believed “God will provide for their medical and financial needs” when they had historically 
paid medicare, social security, and unemployment insurance taxes), aff ’d on other grounds, NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
49 Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1300 (burden is “minimal”); Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (burden is “de 
minimis”).
50 Loomis, supra note 5, at 465 & n.8 (“[When the expenses of contraception are pooled, the increase 
in cost to employers and employees is negligible … . [] ‘The added cost for employers providing [contracep-
tion] coverage corresponds to $1.43 per month, which represents a mean increase of less than 1% in em-
ployers’ costs of providing employees with medical coverage.’”) (quoting JAcqUeLIne e. dARRoch, coST 
To eMPLoYeR heALTh PLAnS oF coVeRIng conTRAcePTIVeS (1998)).
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of the private and independent choices of employees.51 If this is a burden on the em-
ployer’s religious exercise at all, it certainly is not “substantial.”
5. Existing Off-Label Coverage
Oral and other hormonal contraceptives are often prescribed for reasons other 
than preventing pregnancy.52 Many nonexempt religious employers who oppose the 
contraception mandate have actually covered the mandated contraceptive services for 
many years, so long as they are prescribed for a reason other than preventing preg-
nancy. Roman Catholic “double-effect doctrine,” for example, permits the use of con-
traceptives to treat a variety of conditions unrelated to preventing pregnancy,53 and 
even some self-insured plans by nonexempt Roman Catholic employers reimburse 
health care providers for filling contraceptive prescriptions written to treat such con-
ditions. The burden that the contraception mandate imposes on the anti-contracep-
tion beliefs of nonexempt religious employers is reduced when such employers already 
cover the mandated contraceptives for treatment of conditions unrelated to prevent-
ing pregnancy. In such circumstances, the mandate does not require the addition of 
contraceptive coverage in the first place, but only addition of a basis for provider re-
imbursement when contraception is prescribed.
*     *     *
The contraception mandate does not require any religious employer to use, en-
dorse, facilitate, or directly pay any meaningful amount for the use of contraceptives. 
When combined with the fact that many nonexempt religious employers already cover 
many mandated contraceptives when prescribed for reasons other than preventing 
pregnancy, any burden the mandate imposes on a religious employer’s exercise of its 
religious anti-contraception tenets approaches the vanishing point.
B.	 non-BurdenSome	AlTernATiveS
As a general matter, religious organizations and individuals may not dictate to the 
government the conditions on which they will comply with the law. The broad 
51 O’Brien, slip op. at 11, 13.
The burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contrib-
ute to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by health 
care providers and patients covered by [plaintiff]’s plan, subsidize someone else’s 
participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiff’s religion. This Court 
rejects the proposition that requiring indirect financial support of a practice, from 
which plaintiff himself abstains according to his religious principles, constitutes a 
substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise.
… Under plaintiff’s interpretation of RFRA, a law substantially burdens one’s reli-
gion whenever it requires an outlay of funds that might eventually be used by a third 
party in a manner inconsistent with one’s religious values. This is at most a de mi-
nimis burden on religious practice.
 Id.
52 See Rachel K. Jones, Beyond Birth Control: The Overlooked Benefits of  Oral Contraceptive Pills 
(Guttmacher Inst., Nov. 2011), at 3.
53 Cf. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of  Double Effect, pt. 2, ex. 3, STAn. encYc. PhIL. (July 28, 2004, rev. 
Sept. 7, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ (“A doctor who believed that abortion was 
wrong, even in order to save the mother’s life, might nevertheless consistently believe that it would be 
permissible to perform a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman with cancer. In carrying out the hysterecto-
my, the doctor would aim to save the woman’s life while merely foreseeing the death of the fetus.”).
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religious pluralism of American society makes it impractical, if not impossible, to 
exempt or accommodate every variant of religious practice that might be burdened by 
neutral and general laws.54 Accordingly, it is well established that religiously neutral, 
generally applicable laws that merely make religious exercise more difficult or expen-
sive without prohibiting it do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.55 Thus, when gov-
ernment imposes a religiously neutral, generally applicable obligation that can be 
satisfied in multiple ways, some of which do not substantially burden religious exer-
cise, the obligation does not constitute a “substantial burden” even if the nonburden-
some alternatives are more difficult, more expensive, or less preferred by the religious 
organization or individual. In other words, a religious employer may not claim a “sub-
stantial burden” under RFRA simply because government action interferes with the 
employer’s preferred manner of operating, so long as other more difficult or expensive 
ways of complying with the action do not interfere with the employer’s religious exer-
cise.56 Applying this analysis, three alternatives to adding mandated contraception 
coverage do not burden employer religious exercise: the grandfathered-plan exemp-
tion, provision of the mandated contraceptives by third-party insurers, and termina-
tion of health care coverage.
1. Grandfathered-Plan Exemption
As explained above, subject to certain conditions, the ACA allows health care 
plans to continue the coverage in existence at the time the ACA was enacted. If a non-
exempt religious employer offered a plan without contraceptive coverage as of the day 
the ACA was enacted, it may continue that plan without adding the mandated contra-
ception coverage. The contraception mandate, therefore, does not constitute a sub-
stantial burden on any nonexempt religious employer whose plan qualifies for the 
grandfathered-plan exemption.
2. Third-Party Insurers
The final interim regulations affirming the religious-employer exemption also an-
nounced a one-year enforcement safe harbor for religious organizations that do not 
qualify as “religious employers” under the exemption, during which the Departments 
indicated their intention to “work with stakeholders to develop alternative ways of 
providing contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing” for employees of nonexempt 
religious employers that object to the mandate.57 Specifically, the Departments intend 
to develop regulations allowing a religious organization to contract with third-party 
insurers to offer health insurance that does not cover contraception to which they 
object, so long as the third-party insurer provides the uncovered contraception directly 
54 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
55 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1980); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 704, 706 (1986) 
(plurality opinion); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606.
56 See, e.g., Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that individual insurance-
purchase mandate was not substantial burden under RFRA where plaintiffs could make a “shared respon-
sibility payment” instead of actually obtaining health insurance); cf. Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village 
of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that village’s refusal to allow construction of 
church in industrial zone was not a substantial burden under RLUIPA where many alternative locations 
within village were available).
57 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012). The Departments also announced their intention to pursue 
alternatives for self-insured religious organizations that object to the mandate, but did not identify any 
potential alternatives. Id.
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to the organization’s employees at no cost.58 This alternative should eliminate any 
conceivable substantial burden for nonexempt religious employers who provide health 
care coverage through a third-party insurer. The employer is not explicitly or implic-
itly endorsing or facilitating contraception use, since it is not providing contracep-
tives. The employer also is not subsidizing contraception use: since contraception 
coverage does not raise the net health care costs, the premium should be the same 
whether contraception is covered or not.59
Third-party provision of the mandated contraception will not relieve any burdens 
imposed by the mandate on nonexempt religious employers who self-insure. Self-
insurance means that there is no third-party insurer available to such employers with 
the financial ability and incentive to supply the mandated contraception services with-
out cost-sharing; self-insured employers would have to supply the contraceptives 
themselves. Self-insurers, however, are free to implement their health insurance plans 
through third-party insurers who supply mandated contraceptives without cost-shar-
ing. There is no constitutional right to self-insure; indeed, in most states self-insur-
ance is a privilege governed by statute. Switching to a third-party insurer will probably 
cost the religious employer more and may be undesirable in other ways, but Supreme 
Court precedent is clear that such burdens are not substantial.
3. Termination of  Plan
Some comments by nonexempt religious employers on the proposed interim final 
regulations threatened termination of their health care plans if the religious-employ-
er exemption were not expanded.60 For religious employers with less than 50 employ-
ees, termination of health insurance coverage constitutes a means of complying with 
the mandate without burdening such employers’ religious anti-contraception be-
liefs.61 Employers who feel a religious obligation to provide their employees with 
health care insurance could supply them with additional salary compensation suffi-
cient to purchase adequate health care insurance on the individual-policy market that 
the ACA is creating.62
It would be ironic if the effect of a statutory initiative designed to extend health 
care insurance coverage to the uninsured population resulted in termination of group 
insurance plans by some nonexempt religious employers. Whether this possibility is 
an acceptable trade-off for extended contraception coverage, however, is a legislative 
58 Id.
59 For a discussion of why the premium should be the same whether contraception is covered or not, 
see sources cited supra note 48 and accompanying text. A nonexempt religious employer can ensure that 
it is not paying for its insurers’ separate provision of no-cost contraceptives by instructing the insurer to 
calculate the employer’s premium as if its employees do not have access to contraceptives. 
60 77 Fed. Reg. at 8727.
61 Employers with less than 50 employees are not required by the ACA to offer health insurance cover-
age. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980(H)(c)(2)(A) (West 2012). Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91-92 (Cal.) (“Catholic Charities may … avoid this conflict by not offering coverage for 
prescription drugs. The [state contraception mandate] applies only to employers who choose to offer in-
surance coverage for prescription drugs; it does not require any employer to offer such coverage.”), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.y. 
2006) (The state contraception mandate “does not literally compel” religious employers “to purchase 
contraceptive coverage for their employees, in violation of their religious beliefs; it only requires that poli-
cies that provide prescription drug coverage include coverage for contraceptives. Plaintiffs are not required 
by law to purchase prescription drug coverage at all.”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007).
62 Cf. Serio, 859 N.E.2d at 468 (“[I]t is surely not impossible, though it may be expensive or difficult, 
to compensate employees adequately without including prescription drugs in their group health care 
policies.”).
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policy choice that does not affect the conclusion that termination of one’s health care 
plan would remove an employer from the contraception mandate, and thus consti-
tutes a non-burdensome way to comply with the mandate.
III. THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST
A law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it lacks neutrality or gener-
ality, so long as it is narrowly tailored to the protection of compelling government 
interests.63 Similarly, a law does not violate RFRA even if it substantially burdens reli-
gious exercise, if it satisfies the compelling interest test.64 The contraception mandate 
satisfies both requirements.
A.	 governmenT	inTereSTS
The Departments identified multiple government interests implemented by the 
contraception mandate, including better treatment of conditions unrelated to preg-
nancy for which contraceptives are often prescribed,65 improvement of the health of 
pregnant women and newborn children,66 reduction in the cost of employer-spon-
sored health care plans,67 reduction in workplace inequalities between men and 
women,68 and reduction in the disparate health care costs borne by men and women.69 
Some of these interests have been held to be individually “compelling,”70 or have been 
found individually to outweigh personal free exercise or other constitutional rights 
even though not formally labeled “compelling.”71 Any of these interests would indi-
vidually satisfy the requirement of a compelling government interest. Courts have also 
63 E.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
64 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (West 2012).
65 77 Fed. Reg. at 8727 (“Contraceptives also have medical benefits for women who are contra-
indicated for pregnancy, and there are demonstrated preventive health benefits from contraceptives relat-
ing to conditions other than pregnancy (e.g., treatment of menstrual disorders, acne, and pelvic pain).”).
66 Id. (“[W]omen experiencing an unintended pregnancy may not immediately be aware that they 
are pregnant, and thus delay prenatal care. They also may not be as motivated to discontinue behaviors 
that pose pregnancy-related risks (e.g., smoking, consumption of alcohol). Studies show a greater risk 
of preterm birth and low birth weight among unintended pregnancies compared with pregnancies that 
were planned.”).
67 Id. (“[T]here are significant cost savings to employers from the coverage of contraceptives.”).
68 Id. at 8728 (“Researchers have shown that access to contraception improves the social and eco-
nomic status of women. Contraceptive coverage, by reducing the number of unintended and potentially 
unhealthy pregnancies, furthers the goal of eliminating this disparity by allowing women to achieve equal 
status as healthy and productive members of the job force.”).
69 Id. (“[O]wing to reproductive and sex-specific conditions, women use preventive services more than 
men, generating significant out-of-pocket expenses for women. The Departments aim to reduce these 
disparities by providing women broad access to preventive services, including contraceptive services.”).
70 E.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 783-84 (1972) (“[P]ublic health needs” are “compelling” 
government interests.”); Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 498 (10th Cir.1998) (“[P]
ublic health is a compelling government interest… .”).
71 E.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding against Speech 
Clause challenge government restrictions on anti-abortion protests designed to protect unimpeded access 
to pregnancy-related services); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding against free exer-
cise challenge state restrictions on child labor).
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found related interests individually “substantial,” “important,” or “significant.”72 
Together these related interests might additionally constitute a collectively “compel-
ling” government goal that would outweigh a nonexempt employer’s interest in per-
sonal or group free exercise.
B.	 AlTernATive	meAnS
1. Exemption 
Wisconsin v. Yoder held that the Amish were entitled to an exemption from a state 
statute requiring school attendance until age sixteen.73 Acknowledging that the state 
had an undeniably compelling interest in generally requiring a minimum level of edu-
cation in its citizens, the Court held that the state nevertheless lacked a compelling 
interest in applying the statute to the Amish. The Court noted both the strong voca-
tional education that Amish children received from their families and community, as 
well as the small number and insularity of Amish communities as factors suggesting 
that exempting them from the minimum attendance requirement would have little ef-
fect on the state’s overall goal of an educated citizenry properly equipped to support 
itself economically and participate in voting and other acts of self-government. Thus, 
when religiously burdensome government action is subjected to strict scrutiny, an ex-
emption may be the least restrictive alternative if the number of persons exempted is 
so small that the effect on the government’s regulatory purposes is negligible. The 
Court has applied this same principle to application of the compelling-interest test 
under RFRA.74
The mandate exists to extend no-cost contraceptive services to as many women as 
possible. Data are hard to find, but employees of nonexempt nonprofit religious em-
ployers in the United States number at least in the hundreds of thousands, if not the 
millions, while employees of for-profit religious employers engaged in commercial 
markets number at least in the tens of millions. Enlarging the religious employer ex-
emption to include all religious organizations and all secular for-profit employers 
owned by persons who object to contraception would substantially undermine the 
government’s compelling goals due to the very large numbers of employees who would 
be denied contraception coverage by such an exemption.75
72 E.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (State’s “compelling interest in eradi-
cating discrimination against its female citizens” justified infringement of associational freedom); IMS 
Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 277 (2d Cir. 2010) (States “have substantial interest in both lowering 
health care costs and protecting public health.”), overruled on other grounds, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) (stat-
ute not least restrictive means); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 268 (2000) (Protecting “a woman’s 
right to seek reproductive health services” is “important government interest.”); United States v. Wilson, 
154 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[P]rotecting women who are in need of reproductive health services” is 
“significant government interest.”); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[E]nsuring access 
to lawful health services and protecting the constitutional right of women seeking abortions and other 
pregnancy-related treatment” are “important government interests.”); cf. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“[T]he State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in 
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”).
73 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74 Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429-31 (2006).
75 Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 93-94 (Cal.) (“Catholic 
Charities argues the Legislature could more widely exempt employers from the [state contraception man-
date] without increasing the number of affected women by mandating public funding of prescription 
contraceptives for the employees of exempted employers. [] But Catholic Charities points to no authority 
requiring the state to subsidize private religious practices.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
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2. Direct Government Subsidy
Some nonexempt religious employers have argued that the government could ensure 
the availability of no-cost contraceptive coverage to women who lack such coverage in 
their religious-employer group health plans by paying for such coverage itself. Such 
employers argue that this alternative is inexpensive, and thus a less restrictive alterna-
tive to application of the mandate to nonexempt religious employers. However, even if 
the cost of government provision of no-cost contraception were low, which is doubtful,76 
a religious person’s right to an exemption does not include the right to demand that the 
government pay for the exemption. The government may do this if it chooses, but it is 
not constitutionally required to do so. Having the government pay more money to 
implement the contraception mandate solely to exempt a larger range of religious em-
ployers is thus not a constitutionally required less-restrictive alternative.
*     *     *
The government has multiple interests which individually and together are “com-
pelling” and which are implemented in the least restrictive manner by the mandate. 
Accordingly, regardless of whether the mandate is found to be a neutral and general 
law or to substantially burden religious exercise, it still satisfies the doctrinal require-
ments of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.
IV. FOR-PROFIT COMMERCIAL RELIGIOUS EMPLOyERS
The principles and conclusions discussed above apply equally to non-profit and 
for-profit religious employers. They apply with particular force, however, to for-profit 
employers. Federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment incorpo-
rate national values that condemn an employer’s use of the economic leverage of cur-
rent or prospective employment to penalize employees for their religious practices or 
to compel them involuntarily to conform to the religious practices of others. 
Accordingly, it is well established that neutral and general laws that regulate public or 
commercial markets do not generally constitute “substantial burdens” on religious 
exercise when the burdened persons or groups have voluntarily entered those mar-
kets.77 This is particularly the case when exemption from such laws would impose the 
costs of the employer’s religious practices on nonadherents or the government.78 
76 See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
77 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-05 (1985) (Application of federal 
minimum wage standards to a religion’s commercial activities held not a burden on religion’s free exercise 
rights.); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06 (Sunday closing law that “imposed some financial sacrifice” on 
Orthodox Jewish business owner who observed the Jewish Sabbath did not violate Free Exercise Clause 
because law “regulates a secular activity” and merely “operates to make the practice of [the owner’s] reli-
gious beliefs more expensive.”).
78 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“When followers of a particular sect enter 
into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in 
that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the 
employer’s religious faith on the employees.”); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 
N.E.2d 459, 468 (N.y. 2006) (“[W]hen a religious organization chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at least 
to some degree, be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to protect those employees’ legitimate 
interests in doing what their own beliefs permit.”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 816 (2007); cf. Estate of Thornton 
v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (finding state statute giving employees absolute right to time off on their 
Sabbath violated Establishment Clause because of burden statute imposed on others); TWA v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not give employee right to religious 
exemption from seniority system because of burden this would impose on other employees).
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Churches and other nonprofit religious organizations enjoy narrow exemptions 
from religious antidiscrimination laws,79 but such exemptions have never been grant-
ed to for-profit commercial enterprises.80 There is good reason for this. Compliance 
with employment laws is complex and burdensome, and exempting for-profit com-
mercial religious employers from such laws will often result in competitive advantage. 
More fundamentally, it would enable the use of employment to encourage and even to 
compel involuntary employee conformance with the employer’s religious practices. 
Finally, the potential number of for-profit commercial religious employers who might 
claim this exemption is huge; recognizing it would fundamentally distort employment 
markets in favor of religious employers.
Exempting for-profit commercial religious employers from the contraception man-
date would have precisely this effect. Such employers are prohibited from making em-
ployment decisions on the basis of an applicant’s or employee’s religious affiliation or 
lack thereof, and thus virtually always employ large numbers of people who do not 
share the religious anti-contraception values of their employer. Granting such em-
ployers an exemption from the mandate forces employees to bear the costs of observ-
ing the tenets of their employer’s religion even when they do not belong to it or 
interpret those tenets differently.
Just as religious employers may not dictate to the government the conditions on 
which they will obey the law, they may not dictate the conditions on which govern-
ment may regulate their participation in public and commercial markets on a for-
profit basis.
V. CONCLUSION: RELIGIOUS LIBERTy IS NOT THE RIGHT  
TO IMPOSE ONE’S RELIGION ON OTHERS
One might argue that the public’s interest in the admittedly extensive public non-
profit services provided by religious universities, hospitals, charities, and other reli-
gious employers justify exempting them from the contraception mandate. But the 
mandate also provides important public services and protects considerable govern-
ment interests, notably the enhancement of women’s health and the elimination of 
gender inequities. The resolution of conflicts between such interests and values are 
properly entrusted to the political branches.
In accordance with the authority granted it by Congress in the ACA, the Executive 
Branch has crafted regulations appropriate to constitutional and other national val-
ues, by generally exempting religious employers from the mandate when doing so 
does not impose the employers’ religious values and practices on employees who do 
not share them. This is all that religious employers can reasonably expect. To para-
phrase one court, religious liberty is a shield, not a sword; it is not to be used to im-
pose one’s religion on others.81 Religious liberty simply does not entail a right in 
religious employers to force their employees to observe and to pay the costs of anti-
contraception beliefs that the employees do not share.
79 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, § 702 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1) (exempting 
religious employers from the Act “with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion 
to perform work connected with the carrying on” of the religious employer’s activities); Hosanna-Tabor 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 112 S.Ct. 694 (2012) (upholding judicially created exemption from Civil Rights 
Act as applied to ministerial employment decisions).
80 E.g, Tony & Susan Alamo, 471 U.S. at 303-05; cf. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327 (1987) (upholding § 702 against Establishment Clause challenge, but only as to nonprofit activities).
81 See O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (E.D.Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), slip 
op. at 12 (“RFRA is a shield, not a sword. [I]t is not a means to force one’s religious practices on others.”).
